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The Case Against United States-Canada Free Trade
by Mel Watkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Free-trade is coming to have a variety of meanings in the Canada-U.S.
context. The recent Government of Canada discussion paper How to
Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to Export Markets sets out four
options. The first is the status quo, which leaves three free-trade options.
They are, in the present official language (which will do anything to
avoid the words "free-trade"): sectoral (free-trade in a specific sector or
sectors of the economy, e.g., textiles or petrochemicals); comprehensive
(an across-the-board bilateral free-trade agreement); and framework (cre-
ating an institutional mechanism to improve Canada-U.S. commercial
relations).
We are repeatedly told in Canada that the United States preference
is for a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Originally, during the Tru-
deau Government, the Canadian preference was the sectoral option. On
the whole-though with some reservations-the experience with the
AutoPact makes Canadians receptive to the sectoral option. However,
the job guarantees for Canada that were built into that arrangement are
critical to this receptivity. If sectoral integration now means, as it appar-
ently does for the U.S., no such guarantees for Canada, then many
Canadians would be opposed to it, at a time when there is an intolerable
level of unemployment in Canada.
One suspects that the preference of the present Mulroney Govern-
ment is the framework agreement. What manifestly lies behind that op-
tion is the fear in Canada that the United States will go protectionist
against the world, including Canada. Behind the fancy language of
"framework agreement" and "secure and enhance access" is the straight-
forward and understandable Canadian desire to return to the relationship
that existed with the U.S. prior to 1971. It was the era of exemptionism,
because Canada was exempted, albeit only after special pleading in each
case, from American measures such as the Interest Equalization Tax of
the early 1960's, or the later directives to multinational corporations to
repatriate more profits. That period, which also included the acquies-
cence of the U.S. to bilateral sectoral arrangements that were special to
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Canada (automobiles and armaments), ended in 1971 when President
Nixon unilaterally declared Canada to be an independent country.
Given the extraordinary trade dependence of Canada on the United
States, and the threat of protectionist forces in the U.S. arbitrarily reduc-
ing Canadian access to the American market, no sensible person could
oppose returning to that earlier arrangement. The problem, however, is
that in order to get that exemption, Canada may have to agree to the
American preferred option of comprehensive free-trade and risk a further
massive dose of continental integration. True, some see that economic
integration is itself a virtue. I see it, as I will try to demonstrate, as a
price too high for Canada to pay.
It seems to me unlikely that any of the three free-trade options can
survive the dual test of feasibility and desirability. Moreover, the severity
of the present economic crisis in Canada makes the status quo option
unacceptable. So much for the government's four options!
There is, of course, another option that is not mentioned in the gov-
ernment paper but does exist. It is to move to secure the Canadian mar-
ket for Canadian producers. It would use access to the Canadian market
as a bargaining chip to get the multinationals to produce more in Canada
and it would enhance domestic content arrangements. In effect, the op-
tion is to put in place an industrial strategy based on greater self-reliance
and less dependence for Canadians. The details have been cogently set
out by Abraham Rotstein in his study for the Canadian Institute on Eco-
nomic Policy: Rebuilding the Canadian Economy.
II. ECONOMISTS AND DISSENT TO FREE TRADE
To be an economist and to oppose free-trade is tantamount to her-
esy. Nothing is more central to orthodox economic theory than the case
for free-trade based on comparative advantage without impediments
from tariffs or other barriers (and its concomitant, the case for free mo-
bility of capital with no discrimination based on nationality). But theory
hardens into ideology, and intellectual paradigms become monopolies of
knowledge whose practitioners are intolerant of dissent. (I have tenure
and do not have to worry about my heresy.)
It is, nevertheless, intellectually legitimate to have doubts and to dis-
sent. In fact, there have always been doubters and dissenters amongst
economists about free-trade. Nor is it politically illegitimate to have such
doubts. In the present election campaign in Ontario, the three major
political leaders are all opposed to free-trade.
Economists need to remind themselves that the mighty John May-
nard Keynes published an article in 1933 (on the occasion of the last
great economic crisis) entitled National Self-Sufficiency, in which he
questioned the virtues of interdependence. His subsequent role at Bret-
ton Woods in creating the institutions for a more interdependent post-
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World War II economy may reflect a change of mind, or it may signify
the inevitable corruption of the intellectual by power.
There have also been schools of dissent. Economic history- in
which I was originally trained-emerged as a subset of economics in re-
action to the free-trade bias of British-centered neo-classical economics,
with its false claim to universality. Economic historians, then and now,
have found no clear correlation between free-trade and economic growth.
Some have claimed the converse. The great classical economist, David
Ricardo, used as the example of his famous Law of Comparative Advan-
tage with Mutual Gains from Trade, England specializing in manufac-
turing cloth and Portugal in making wine. Textbooks still use this
example, but never point out the uncomfortable fact that Britain went on
to become the workshop of the world while Portugal remained backward
and marginalized.
Those who know economic history could cite the record of industri-
alization behind tariff walls (or their non-tariff barrier equivalents) of the
United States, Germany and Japan. In 1828 the U.S. passed a tariff
known as the "Tariff of Abominations." It was the highest the world has
ever seen, and resulted in one of the most rapid growth periods the
American economy has ever experienced. In Germany and Japan, the
pursuit of protectionist policies has not been inconsistent with rapid eco-
nomic growth.
In Canada, the best description of our economic history has been
given by the late Harold Innis in his "staples approach." Innis taught us
that Canada was a staples producer, a hinterland that produced staples
and exported resources to more advanced industrialized areas, and that
the resulting Canadian economy was, therefore, vulnerable and depen-
dent. He warned of the limitations of the price system for the periphery
and insisted on a positive role for the state. The thrust of his advice,
particularly in his later years immediately after World War II, was that
Canada should lessen its dependence on the United States. Canada re-
mains a dependent staples economy. Trade policy, including any free-
trade arrangements with the United States as imperium, needs to be
judged explicitly within that context.
Innis' work slips into the second of the more fundamental schools of
dissent, that of political economy. Political economists (amongst whom I
would count myself) doubt the certainty of mutual benefits from trade
and point towards cumulative tendencies to underdevelopment and to-
wards persistent disparities between countries. They see orthodox theory
as the ideology of the powerful and dominant, and speak of the imperial-
ism of free-trade. They do not see the harmonies of the market, but con-
flict between capital and labor-where capital is the mobile corporation
which treats the world as its oyster and labor is immobile people rooted
in communities, including national communities. They understand why
workers, and their unions, and their political parties, tend to doubt the
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virtues of free-trade. Hence, in Canada, political economists tend to be
economic nationalists.
Political economists read Canadian history as showing that the Ca-
nadian business elite has always had a comprador cast of mind. The ten-
dency for more than a century has been for that elite to be integrated into
the American elite, and to be continentalist rather than either nationalist
or internationalist. (One of the myths of Canadian history is that we
fluctuate between nationalist policies and internationalist policies. The
reality is that our policies have more consistently been of a continentalist
nature. Was Canada's famous national policy, the "High Tariff of 1879"
economic nationalism, or was it a variety of continentalism to attract
branch plants?)
This attitude suggests that Canadian business will go for free-trade if
it believes it can thereby secure its continental niche. Canada-U.S. free-
trade would lead to a further integration of elites, and would thereby
enhance the continentalist orientation of Canadian business. As evidence
of the differing interests of capital and labor, Canadian trade unions are
moving in precisely the opposite direction, as shown by the breaking
away of the Canadian UAW from the American union. All forces in
Canadian society are not simply moving towards integration.
Dissent from the free-trade doctrine is, then, legitimate both intel-
lectually and in terms of flowing from popular social forces. It is even
legitimate for Americans to dissent, as is done most cogently by the eco-
nomic commentator Robert Kuttner in his new book, The Economic Il-
lusion. He reminds us that in the real world comparative advantage
(which is said to dictate what we must do) is not God-given, but created
by mere mortals, and that governments play a role under the rubric of
industrial policy that is often decisive.
The risk, Kuttner states, is that the theory of free-trade becomes an
ideology which prevents governments from formulating effective indus-
trial policies. American industrial policy becomes a combination of ad
hocery and arms spending. This latter point is serious: the United States
has a major industrial policy which is based on spending by the Penta-
gon. (Although this spending is potent, it is more likely to weaken the
U.S. industrial base than strengthen it.) According to Kuttner, the U.S.
then tries to make the rest of the world follow suit. It tells other coun-
tries that their national policies are market imperfections that must go-
that they too should spend more on arms. I would add that Canada is
already being affected by these misguided American practices and would
simply become more susceptible to them with the quantum leap in eco-
nomic integration that would come from free-trade.
III. THE RISKS FOR CANADA
Why is free-trade between Canada and the United States on the
agenda of politics now? For Canada-which, it seems, has primarily put
[Vol. 10:89 1985]
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it there-the answer is fear of U.S. protectionism: if the wall goes up, we
want to be inside that wall, not outside. That is fair enough, but we
should all stop for a moment and contemplate what this means.
In the past, the virtues of free-trade were always preached to
Canadians in terms of our growing up, taking on the world, becoming
mature and competitive, and loyally following American leadership into
a world free of barriers to trade. But now we are being told that we
should abandon Canadian protectionism-for what? The answer, it
turns out, looks suspiciously like North American protectionism. (And,
if someone objects that the U.S. intends bilateralism to become multilat-
eral, then Canada will have gained no preferential access to the Ameri-
can market and will have gained little, if anything.) Is this free-trade?
Or is it a new form of protectionism?
There is certainly a deep irony here. When the U.S. practices free-
trade, Canada follows, with some Canadians advocating going further
and seeking free-trade with the U.S. But if the U.S. ceases to practice
free-trade, we are still told to seek free-trade with the U.S. The contra-
diction is real; it inheres in dependency and impotence. No matter what
the United States does, Canada receives the same advice. I become suspi-
cious of this.
Where does this leave us with respect to the economic benefits for
Canada, so much extolled by economists? The scenario that is now being
talked about sounds more like containing damage or minimizing eco-
nomic costs. The rationale is, after all, to secure trade. If it can then be
enhanced, fine, but that will be a bonus and is not thought necessary to
justify the exercise. Let us be honest about what we are talking about.
We are not talking about increasing the standard of living and creating
jobs; we are talking about protecting the standard of living and protect-
ing jobs. This is not a solution to the present economic crisis and the
intolerable level of unemployment, but a way to keep them from getting
worse.
And if the point is to secure trade, to secure access to the American
market, what is the likelihood that it will also secure-meaning en-
trench-the nature of that trade: Canada's status as a staple producer
and resource hinterland? If almost five centuries of history be our guide,
it is extremely difficult for Canada to break out of this pattern. There is
no reason to believe that North American free-trade will do it. I would
read economic history as showing us that peripheral areas like Canada
would need much tougher state policies to succeed; not market policies,
but intervention policies. However, under free-trade with the U.S., pre-
cisely the opposite will happen; instead of more policy there will be less.
This reads very differently from what my economist colleagues have
been telling me over the years. Am I too gloomy? Are there perhaps
economic benefits in the long-run for Canada? The answer is: yes, per-
haps, but perhaps not. International trade theory, Keynesianism, and
common sense all tell us that there are no guarantees as to where jobs
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will be located under free-trade. Nor can we say how gains will end up
being distributed. It is evident from the persistence of regional dispari-
ties within countries that a free-trade area is not a universal panacea.
From the Canadian experience, sectoral arrangements fare better but are
not without problems. To quote political scientist Stephen Clarkson
from his excellent book Canada and the Reagan Challenge:
The sectors of Canadian industry that have experienced modified
forms of free-trade-automobiles, defense production, farm equip-
ment-have not produced economic salvation. They have generated
technologically dependent, managerially backward and economically
weak industries that provide a cautionary rather than exemplary expe-
rience. . . . There is little evidence. . . that the United States would
want to establish a free-trade zone with Canada on any basis other
than as a resource satellite.
There is, as well, a phenomenon that did not exist in Ricardo's time,
the vexing issue of foreign ownership-with which Canada is uniquely
endowed-and how it affects the distribution of those mutual gains. If
the tariff facilitated foreign ownership, what will happen under free-
trade? Would foreign ownership fall, and if it fell what would replace it
and what would happen to jobs? Under free-trade, would Canada have
to treat foreign capital better so that it would stay? Could Canada have
any policy towards foreign ownership at all given American tendencies to
define such policies as protectionist? Significantly, the better to pave the
way toward trade negotiations with the U.S., Canada unilaterally further
emasculated an already weak Foreign Investment Review Agency and
renamed it Investment Canada.
A good deal is known about the behavior of foreign subsidiaries in
Canada with respect to exports and imports and how that has worked to
inhibit industrialization. Statistics Canada data show the high propen-
sity of foreign subsidiaries to import from parent companies. Govern-
ment archives enable scholars to document the long history of export-
blocking by parents vis-a-vis subsidiaries. How would free-trade, particu-
larly when preceded by the weakening of any policy toward foreign own-
ership, remove these structural deficiencies? Do we think these things
that have been around for a century are just going to go away?
The bottom line, though, on this matter of economic effects is to link
it with the question of political effects-the effects on sovereignty. This
means, concretely, the capacity to formulate policy and to give it effect.
This is not an abstract question, but one of very practical importance.
The widely held perception in Canada is that free-trade with the
U.S. would lessen an already limited Canadian autonomy. Even people
who expect economic benefits fear political costs. And, if there are polit-
ical costs, can there be economic benefits? We are always told that free-
trade will create winners and losers, but surely no government would
simply sit back and casually watch that happen, doing nothing no matter
what the outcome. Is it not rather the case that winners emerge out of a
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creative interface between business and government, involving positive
and creative government policy? The great risk for Canada is succinctly
put by Clarkson: "The price for admission to the American market
would be the economic policies needed to put Canadian industry in a
position to compete there."
The risk, in the language of economics, is harmonization of the poli-
cies of Canada and the United States. Specifically, it is the tendency of
Canadian policy to ape American policy, if not de jure then de facto,
because of pressures to do the same as the U.S. in order to keep jobs on
the Canadian side of the border. Robert White, the Canadian director of
the UAW, told the National Economic Conference in Ottawa in March:
A policy [of free-trade and economic integration with the U.S.] would
mean that whenever Canada attempts to pursue different social priori-
ties or our own industrial strategy, we would be warned that either
such a policy would leave us less competitive [e.g., if we wanted to
increase layoff protection] or that it would be viewed as an 'unfair'
subsidy to make us more competitive [e.g., an attempt to attract invest-
ment to Quebec or the Maritimes].
The Federal New Democratic Party issued a similar warning in
February:
The requirements of free-trade between the two nations would mean a
number of concessions from Canada. For example, if our tax rates
were higher than those levied on corporations in the U.S., we would be
pressured to cut them in order not to penalize companies operating in
Canada; where our environmental safeguards were more stringent we
would be pressured to lower them to prevent Canadian producers from
operating at a competitive disadvantage; where our wages were higher,
as they are in some industries and regions compared to those in the
southern U.S., we would be under pressure to cut them; and obviously
we would be under considerable pressure to do away with
FIRA....Such pressures would mean the end to Canadian sovereignty
in crucial areas of policy. By pushing for free-trade and further eco-
nomic integration we invite political integration.
I would only add that we can observe in British Columbia how these
kinds of policies, pursued in the name of international competitiveness,
have had disastrous consequences for the economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Canada has a distinctive political culture that has withstood deepen-
ing economic integration with the U.S., but there presumably are limits.
Would an already timid foreign policy become totally syncophantic of
American policy-on Central America, on "Star Wars"? Some argue
that a free-trade area would tie America's hands in the face of Canadian
actions and thereby free Canada to become more independent. I am
doubtful, however, that anyone can tie America's hands and, in any
7
Watkins: The Case against United States-Canada Free Trade
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1985
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
event, I fear that Canadians would become even less willing to try to be
different.
There is a further point on macroeconomic prospects: it may not
make sense for Canada to tie itself yet more tightly to an American econ-
omy as problematic as that economy appears to be. The case can be
made that the American economy is waning in terms of its global hegem-
ony and industrial efficiency, and that it is being grossly mismanaged. Its
present prosperity is substantially a tribute to enormous arms spending,
or military Keynesianism, at the cost of an escalating budget deficit. It is
one thing for Canada to be tied to an efficient, well-managed, benign
economy, another to be tied yet more tightly to a crisis-ridden economy
that seems at times resolved to solve its problems without regard to the
interests of others. There is a need for Canada to attempt to distance
itself more from the United States, difficult as that would be.
The thrust of my remarks is that, if the U.S. moves to protectionism,
Canada should try for exemptions-but not at any price. If relief cannot
be obtained, this would strengthen the existing case for policies of self-
reliance. As I stated at the outset, all can agree that the status quo is not
good enough. What Canada needs is to "secure and enhance" its market
for domestic producers. It needs to move, not along American lines- to
deregulation, more ad hocery, and arms-spending style job creation, but
along an indigenous path to a comprehensive industrial policy and con-
scious economic planning.
[Vol. 10:89 1985]
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 10 [1985], Iss. , Art. 18
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol10/iss/18
